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Decentralised environmental governance has become a catchy solution to environmental problems caused by the 
failure of traditional centralised environmental governance. It promises to transfer power and authority, improve 
efficiency, equity, accountability, and inclusion of local people who were previously excluded by the command and 
control model.  This paper examines the efficacy of decentralised environmental governance as an  alternative 
approach to wildlife conservation in Tanzania.  We analyse the policy and legal framework for Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs) in Tanzania over the past two decades as a case study on current practice and its implications. We 
find that despite the rhetoric  of community-based conservation (CBC), the wildlife industry remains heavily under 
state control, while the promises of CBC remain elusive. Questioning the effectiveness of decentralised 
environmental governance through CBC, we recommend that actors return to the drawing board and re-negotiate 
their positions, interests, power and authority if meaningfully decentralised environmental governance is to be 
achieved.  
Key Words: decentralization, governance, wildlife management areas, development, Tanzania 
 
Résumé 
La gouvernance environnementale décentralisée est devenue une solution attirante en réponse aux problèmes 
environnementaux liés à l'échec des approches gouvernementales centralisées et traditionnelles concernant 
l'environnement. Elle permet le transfert du pouvoir et d'autorisation gouvernementale, d'améliorer l'efficacité, 
l'équité, la responsabilité et l'inclusion des populations locales précédemment exclues par l'approche 
gouvernementale d'autorité et contrôle. Dans cet article, nous utilisons la gouvernance environnementale 
décentralisée pour examiner son efficacité comme outil de protection de la nature communautaire (PNC) en 
Tanzanie. En particulier, nous analysons la cadre politique et juridique des Zones de Gestion des Ressources 
Fauniques (ZGF) mise en œuvre en Tanzanie au cours des deux dernières décennies comme une étude de cas pour 
illustrer la pratique courante et les implications de cette approche. Nous constatons que malgré la rhétorique de la 
conservation communautaire, l'industrie de la faune reste fortement sous le contrôle de l'État, tandis que les 
promesses de l'approche communautaire restent douteuses. Ayant questionné l'efficacité de la gouvernance 
environnementale décentralisée par l'entremise de la PNC, nous conseillons que les acteurs renégocient leur 
positions, intérêts, pouvoir et autorité pour qu'une réelle gouvernance environnementale décentralisée puisse être 
atteinte. 
Mots-clés: décentralisation, gouvernance, développement, Tanzanie 
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In the past three decades, there have been concerted efforts to decentralize environmental governance 
throughout the developing world [1, 2]. Defined as “the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and 
organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and outcomes” [3], 
decentralized environmental governance calls for more local participation, integration of development 
and conservation, and democratization [2-7]. In environmental conservation, and particularly wildlife 
conservation, there has been increased advocacy and investment in decentralized environmental 
governance worldwide in the form of community based conservation (hereafter CBC, see Note 1) [8, 9]. 
Drawing its popularity and legitimacy from the ineffective, exclusionary and often highly expensive nature 
of the state-controlled (fortress) conservation approach, CBC positions itself as a participatory form of 
environmental conservation. It advocates more community (see Note 2) participation in management and 
utilization of local resources in order to meet both development and conservation goals with minimum 
transaction costs [10-13].  
 
CBC has been widely implemented in community based management of wildlife, forestry, fisheries, and 
water resources with varying degrees of success and failure [1, 10, 14-17]. It is viewed not only as a 
corrective measure to social wrongs of the past (brought about by fortress conservation), but also as an 
effective way to improve natural resources conservation [18]. The basis of this communal approach to 
conservation is that human development and wildlife conservation goals can be met if communities are 
allowed to manage and utilize resources in their areas of jurisdiction through mutually agreed rules.  
 
This article provides a critical review of more than a decade of CBC in Tanzania’s Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs). We focus on how CBC has shaped the way WMAs are managed in Tanzania and follow 
Lemos and Agrawal [3] in examining decentralized environmental governance as an alternative approach 
to wildlife conservation in Tanzania. 
Received: 7 June 2015; Accepted: 4 August 2015; Published: 14 December 2015 
 
Copyright: © Wilhelm A. Kiwango, Hans C. Komakech, Thadeo M. C. Tarimo and Lawrence Martz. This is an open access 
paper. We use the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/. The 
license permits any user to download, print out, extract, archive, and distribute the article, so long as appropriate credit 
is given to the authors and source of the work. The license ensures that the published article will be as widely available 
as possible and that your article can be included in any scientific archive. Open Access authors retain the copyrights of 
their papers. Open access is a property of individual works, not necessarily journals or publishers. 
 
Cite this paper as: Kiwango, W.A., Komakech, H. C., Tarimo, T. M. C. and Martz, L. 2015. Decentralized Environmental 
Governance: A reflection on its role in shaping Wildlife Management Areas in Tanzania. Tropical Conservation Science 
Vol.8 (4): 1080-1097 Available online: www.tropicalconservationscience.org  
 
Disclosure: Neither Tropical Conservation Science (TCS) or the reviewers participating in the peer review process have 
an editorial influence or control over the content that is produced by the authors that publish in TCS. 
 
 
Mongabay.com Open Access Journal - Tropical Conservation Science Vol.8 (4): 1080-1097, 2015 
 
  
Tropical Conservation Science | ISSN 1940-0829 | Tropicalconservationscience.org 
1082 
This review is important because it covers more than a decade of WMA implementation processes, and 
adds to the growing discourse on decentralized environmental governance. The review examines the 
advocacy of decentralized environmental governance as an appropriate mechanism to meet both 
conservation and development goals, and offers specific recommendations to the actors involved in the 
WMA initiative. 
 
The article is organized into five main sections: the first introduces the CBC concept and its background to 
conservation. The second provides a theoretical background to decentralized environmental governance 
as the underpinning for CBC and its implementation in WMAs. The third section provides a brief history 
of wildlife conservation in Tanzania from the colonial period, highlighting the evolution of the fences and 
fines (fortress conservation) approach and its perceived failures. The emergence of the CBC concept 
follows, its suitability evidenced by the policies, laws and regulations in Tanzania. The fourth section 
discusses the drawbacks of the CBC in practice in Tanzania, particularly its propensity to revert back to the 
command and control approach. In the fifth section we provide our conclusions and implications for 
conservation.  
 
1. Decentralization and natural resources governance: overview 
Governance is defined as the “formal and informal institutions through which authority and power are 
conceived and exercised” and the “political-administrative, economic, social organization and 
accountability of power and authority” [1]. In this paper, institutions are defined as formal and informal 
rules and norms that shape interactions among individuals and with their environment-‘the rules of the 
game’ [17, 36, 67]. Following the massive institutional changes that caused the collapse of the ‘welfare 
state’ and socialist economies in the 1980s, decentralization has become the buzz word for the 
institutional changes on which many governments have embarked [14]. Decentralization, in theoretical 
terms, refers to the transfer or redistribution of power, resources, accountability and administrative 
capacities across different central and local government levels, in political and administrative hierarchy 
[1, 6, 15]. Decentralization, according to Agrawal and Ostrom [15], “has emerged as a major strategy for 
many countries to provide social services, achieve development objectives and undertake environmental 
conservation” [15]. It has become the condition for providing development aid and funding project 
proposals, particularly in the developing world. Since the mid-1980s, decentralized natural resources 
governance has gained momentum in various parts of the developing world [3, 16, 19], with recent 
decentralization ‘language’ embodying the concepts of democracy, pluralism, and rights.  
 
1.1. Why decentralize natural resource governance? 
Decentralized environmental governance aims to redistribute power, authority, resources and 
accountability to lower levels, in accordance with worldwide calls for decentralization to correct the 
inefficiencies of centralized governance mechanisms. Decentralized environmental governance is justified 
because first, it leads to increased efficiency at the local units by encouraging competition among the 
decentralized national units. Failures of the centralized governance system, particularly in the post-
independence era, could be remedied by redistribution of power and authority from central to local 
governments most affected by the exercise of power [1, 3, 15, 16, 20, 21], thereby increasing 
environmental sustainability. Second, bringing decision-making closer to grassroots increases 
participation and accountability [3, 14, 21, 22], internalizingtransaction costs as local actors make 
decisions based on full knowledge of the associated costs and benefits (compared to ‘outsiders’ who 
normally would only consider their own benefits and leave the costs to the locals) and legitimizing 
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decisions more appropriate to local needs [3, 20]. Third, it enables decision makers to take advantage of 
specific temporal and spatial knowledge of the natural resources [3].  
Larson and Ribot [2] further argue that the resultant efficiency, equity and inclusion should result in more 
sustainable management [of natural resources].This explains why decentralization should be pursued, but 
not why state actors, vested with such powers and authority, would actually choose to pursue 
decentralization [15]. Decentralization is thus not only an administrative process, but also a political 
process shaped by demands for change in the status quo (e.g. in managing natural resources) [1, 21]. The 
demands for change represent the interests of different actors in the decentralization process, from 
central government actors to donor agencies, international NGOs and local advocacy groups [15]. These 
interests in turn shape the degree, the extent, and the form of decentralization. . 
 In contrast to administrative decentralization (deconcentration) where powers  are  transferred from the 
central ministries to regional and local  branch offices located elsewhere from the government 
headquarters [1, 2, 21], democratic decentralization is said to occur when  decision making powers  are 
devolved to local  actors who are downwardly accountable to the people in their jurisdiction [2, 21]. It 
integrates local communities in the decision making process by creating more avenues for representation 
and have powers to make and implement decisions based on local demands [1, 2].   With the promises of 
increased efficiency, equity, coordination, accountability, participation, poverty reduction, and inclusion, 
decentralized environmental governance is widely promoted as an alternative to centralized governance 
by the state, which is perceived to be highly ineffective, coercive and undemocratic.  
 
1.2. Implementing decentralized environmental governance in wildlife management 
Despite its promises of more participation, democratization, accountability and devolution, decentralized 
environmental governance is seldom implemented in the way theories suggest. Instead, central 
government actors are often reluctant to redistribute power and resources to local authorities, in effect 
recentralizing power while decentralizing it [1, 14], particularly when the resource at stake, such as 
wildlife, is of high commercial value and state institutions are not transparent [21, 23-25].This is the case 
with the wildlife sector in Tanzania [23, 24, 26-28], where decentralized governance of  Wildlife 
Management Areas (WMA) has received mixed reviews in  more than ten years of practice . Although 
institutions for decentralization (policies, laws and regulations) have been in place, actual devolution of 
power and authority to local actors remains elusive [6, 10, 12, 25,72].  
Furthermore, Goldman [29] argues that decentralization, particularly the participation rhetoric common 
in CBC, often view rural communities as peripheral participants, lacking the knowledge and understanding 
of how nature and conservation are managed and perceived [c.f.30]. This view contradicts two important 
assumptions of CBC: that communities have the incentives to conserve wildlife, and that communities 
have the knowledge and capabilities to conserve wildlife [10, 12]. Participation, according to the 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) [31] has come to mean different things to 
different people. Local participation, according to Cernea [32] means empowering local people to mobilize 
their own resources, to be social actors rather than passive subjects, to manage the resources, to make 
decisions, and to control activities that affect their lives.  For successful CBC initiatives, people must 
actively participate in making decisions that affect the resource in question and how the benefits are 
shared. We discuss in the following sections how the much-advocated decentralized environmental 
governance has led not to increased efficiency, equity and inclusion, but to notable recentralization of 
power and authority by the state. To understand this shift, we first explore the development of wildlife 
conservation in Tanzania.  
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2. Development of wildlife conservation in  Tanzania  
2.1. Pre-Colonial  and during the colonial era  
The move to conserve wildlife and its pristine habitat in then-Tanganyika on the American model of 
national parks dates back to 1891, when the German administration issued the first rules for the use of 
wildlife by both locals and Europeans [6, 33].Before colonialism, the use of wildlife and other resources 
such as forest products, fish, pasture, and agricultural land were regulated according to customary laws 
and regulations. This ‘common property regime’ was controlled by the ruling chiefs/elders, religious men, 
or hunting associations who controlled off take [34].  
In then-Tanganyika, under German and later British colonial rule, wildlife management and use were 
regulated through the control of hunting (see Note 3) and the creation of protected areas known as game 
reserves, game controlled areas, open areas and national parks. This conservation model (in the form of 
protected areas) is commonly known as ‘fortress conservation’, likening the protected areas to a ‘fortress’. 
It is also commonly referred to as ‘command and control’ or ‘fines and fences’ in the conservation 
literature [10, 35].  
The fortress conservation model claims to address the problems of habitat degradation, species 
extinction, declining populations, encroachment, deforestation, desertification, soil erosion, and other 
environmental problems [3, 11, 36] and is known for strict regulations, policies and laws to restrict and 
prohibit human interference with biological conservation, surrendering previously communally-owned 
land and wildlife resources to the colonial administration. This limited locals’ access to and control of the 
resources [33], effectively dispossessing them of their land gradually (by use of policies and laws) or 
actively (involving violence)[27]. The German colonial rule established Selous Game Reserve as the first 
game reserve in 1905, which was officially gazetted in 1921. The British followed with the establishment 
of the Game Department in 1921 and created the Ngorongoro Crater and Serengeti Game Reserves in 
1928 and 1929, respectively.  
 
2.2. Post-Colonial era 
After independence in 1961, the Tanganyika government, like many   post-colonial governments, inherited 
the fortress conservation model with little or no changes [3, 6, 31,33]. More national parks, game reserves 
and game controlled areas were created in line with socialist policies of the time, culminating in the 
enactment of the Wildlife Conservation Act in 1974 [33]. However, according to Nelson [6], the motivation 
for creation of protected areas (PAs) in Tanzania changed from the Europeans’ aesthetic motives to 
national income contribution through tourism. Consequently, up to the 1980s, about 11 national parks 
and 11 game reserves were established [37]. Currently, the country boasts of 16 national parks, 28 game 
reserves, 44 game controlled areas, one conservation area, four Ramsar sites and 38 WMAs, representing 
33.4% of Tanzania’s total surface area (Table 1). 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
Despite the   state’s desire to   reap economic benefits from wildlife-based tourism in the post-colonial 
era through the PAs, the financial and technical capacity to manage them greatly declined, largely due to 
failure of socialist economic policies in the 1970, corruption within state bureaucracies, the 1978-79 war 
with Uganda that worsened the states’ economic conditions, and retirement of senior staff [3, 10, 33, 43]. 
In addition, elephant and rhino poaching intensified in the 1980, particularly in the Selous game reserve 
[10, 33].  Elephants declined from 110,000 in 1976 to just 22,000 in 1991, and the rhino population 
declined from 2,500 in 1976 to 50 in 1986 and 0 in 1991 [33]. This decline in elephant and rhino 
populations prompted the Government to launch “Operation Uhai” (Uhai is a Swahili word for Life) in 
1989, involving the police, the army, and wildlife authorities in a bid to halt the problem [10].  A similar 
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operation, “tokomeza ujangili” (Swahili for ‘eliminate poaching’) was conducted in 2013 in response to 
the recent surge in elephant poaching. These operations require financial, technical and human resources 
which are often scarce within the government. Consequently, the failure of the fortress conservation 
approach shifted government bureaucrats, international conservation organizations, and donor agencies 
toward community based conservation. This gave rise to the emergence and popularity of community 
conservation in the past three decades [31, 33, 44, 45]. The next section provides an overview of the 
emergence of community wildlife management in Tanzania, with emphasis on the WMAs as a 
conservation enterprise embracing decentralized environmental governance through CBC. 
 
Table 1: Categories of Protected areas, administration and land use classification with regards to 
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38 3 29,518.4 Consumptive No Wildlife Division, District 




Ramsar Sites 4 5.2 48,684 Non-
consumptive 
No Wildlife Division (WD) 
Sources: MNRT [38], [39] ERRCG [40] TANAPA [41] [37, 42] 
 
2.3.  The emergence of Wildlife Management Areas in Tanzania. 
2.3.1. Changes in  Tanzania wildlife policy and regulatory framework 
In response to the advocacy and investments in CBC, the Tanzanian government adopted policy and legal 
changes in order to implement the CBC approach. The government formulated and adopted the Wildlife 
Policy of Tanzania (WPT) in 1998 (revised in 2007), the Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) regulations 
(2002, revised 2005, 2012) and the Wildlife Conservation Act (2009) in order to manage wildlife resources 
for the benefit of people [38]. To implement these reforms, the WPT called for the creation of WMAs on 
village lands adjacent to protected areas [38]. WMAs consist of village lands adjacent to core protected 
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areas used by local communities to promote conservation and generate revenues through wildlife-based 
enterprises such as tourist hunting and game viewing. The Wildlife Conservation Act (2009) stipulates 
three basic criteria for areas to be established as WMAs: (1) They must be outside core protected areas 
(see Note 4), (2) they must be used by local community members, and (3) they must be within the village 
land (Figure 1).  These requirements addressed the fact that for decades, communities living adjacent to 
PAs had been denied direct benefits from the use of wildlife resources while at the same time, suffering 
the costs of wildlife conservation. The WPT, in recognition of the need to integrate conservation and 
development, notes that ‘’wildlife conservation as a form of land use has failed to adequately compete 
with other forms of land use, especially to the rural communities’’ [38]. It urges the government to create 
legal, institutional and regulatory ways to allow rural communities and the private sector to benefit from 
the use of wildlife resources [38]. One of the explicit  objectives of the WPT was to “transfer the 
management of WMAs to local communities thus taking care of corridors, migration routes and buffer 
zones and ensure that the local communities obtain substantial tangible (e.g., economic and social) 

















Fig. 1. Map of Tanzania 
showing major protected 
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The idea was that if communities can benefit from wildlife in their village land, they will have incentives 
to conserve the wildlife therein, thus promoting a win-win balance between conservation and socio-
economic well-being of rural communities [8, 10, 12, 30, 45-49]. While the central government through 
the Wildlife Division continues to exercise overall control of wildlife in the country, these policy 
statements were explicit in intent to decentralize environmental governance through CBC in the context 
of WMAs. However, the WPT was enacted while the Wildlife Conservation Act (1974), (based on the strict 
fortress conservation approach) was still in operation. Consequently, a review process started and 
culminated in the ‘new’ Wildlife Conservation Act (2009) that accommodates the policy changes in wildlife 
conservation, particularly the creation of WMAs.  
Meanwhile, the WMA regulations (2002) were issued soon after the WPT to provide the regulatory 
framework for the WMA concept [50]. The regulations came into formal implementation in 2003, with 
the establishment of 16 pilot WMAs across the country [6, 33, 50].  
 
2.3.2.  Establishing WMAs: The process and its implications to CBC 
 According to the WMA regulations (2012) [51], creation of a WMA requires that villagers with land that 
fulfils the criteria to be a WMA, agree in a village assembly to create a WMA. However, the village(s) must 
first establish a Community Based Organization (CBO) with a constitution, and apply for its registration 
through the Ministry of Home Affairs. An additional criterion requires that for an area to be designated a 
WMA: 
“[(i)It must have significant resources (i.e., wildlife and its entire habitat composition) that can be 
accessed, (ii)its natural resources are of significant economic values, (iii)it is ecologically viable or 
form part of an ecologically viable ecosystem, and (iv)it belongs to one or more villages in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of the law governing village land (Village Land Act No 5, 
1999, Land Act No. 4, 1999) and other legislation relating to occupation and use of village land 
[51]” emphasis added] 
When the criteria are met, the village(s) through the District Council can apply to the Director of Wildlife 
(hereafter the Director) for an area to be declared a WMA. The application must be accompanied by  a 
certified copy of the minutes of the village assembly meeting approving the formation of a WMA, a duly 
completed information data sheet outlining the villages forming the WMA, their areas, social economic 
characteristics, the ecological viability and importance of the WMA (e.g., plant and animal species, unique 
processes etc.). Moreover, the application must be accompanied by a certified copy of the certificate of 
incorporation of the CBO, and a land use plan approved by the appropriate authorities [51]. The process 
to establish a WMA and its subsequent declaration are to be implemented simultaneously with the 
process to apply for an Authorized Association status, although the latter has separate requirements (see 
Note 5) and therefore additional technical, financial and human resources that are hardly available at the 
community level. 
The process to establish a WMA according to the regulations has been criticized for being stringent and 
bureaucratic, demanding technical knowledge and understanding of district and national laws and policies 
that are critically lacking at the community level [25, 28, 29]. Additionally, this procedure requires 
significant investment of time and resources [6, 28].  In most cases, NGOs and other professional experts 
from outside the communities have provided the crucial financial, material and  technical assistance 
required to get the WMA created and  functioning [24, 25, 28, 29], although the interests of the NGOs and 
outside professionals may not be same as the communities’ interests[25]. The extent of funding and 
technical assistance is highlighted in the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) status report on Tanzania’s 
Wildlife Management Areas (2012), revealing that the United States Agency for International 
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Development (USAID) through WWF has awarded financial grants totaling US$ 27 Million. The main 
objective of these grants is to facilitate WMA implementation in Tanzania (See Note 6). These grants have 
been channeled through other subsidiary and international conservation NGOs such as the African 
Wildlife Foundation (AWF), Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS), and 
WWF Tanzania country office. The USAID grants have not been limited to large conservation NGOs, but 
have benefited the government through the Wildlife Division as well [28]. 
Not surprisingly, Nelson and Agrawal [24] argue that Tanzania’s CBC approach has thus far not lacked 
financial assistance, but the resources invested have not addressed the underlying institutional problems 
facing wildlife management, chiefly the perceived lack of desired outcomes, particularly from the 
investor’s perspective. While the bureaucratic process to have a WMA and an AA established may be 
viewed as necessary to avoid potential conflicts and uncertainties over land use within and among villages, 
it has contributed significantly to the slow implementation of the decentralization reforms, and hampered 
realization of tangible benefits to communities. Moreover, it has not, in reality, alleviated conflicts in the 
WMAs, since conflicts over land use are common, with some villages withdrawing from the WMA (e.g., 
Minjingu village, in Burunge WMA withdrew from the WMA claiming that they never gave their consent 
to participate in the WMA), while others are considering similar withdrawals due to the few benefits 































 WMAs with AA status
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Since the formal launching of the WMA regulations in 2003 (with revised editions in 2005 and 2012), about 
38 WMA have been created. Of these, 17 WMAs have attained Authorized Association (AA, see Note 7) 
status while 21 more are in different stages of implementation [40, 52]. By 2006, only four WMAs had 
fulfilled the arduous conditions for gazettement (official designation as a WMA in the government 
gazette). These were Burunge, Ngarambe Tapika, Ipole and Uyumbu WMAs (Figure 2).We argue that 
despite legal and policy changes, results on the ground do not reflect or justify the advocacy and 
investments in this approach.  
2.3.3. Achieving development and conservation: no win-win situation 
Regarding the conservation-development compatibility issue advocated by the proponents of community 
conservation, we observe that decentralized environmental governance through the WMA concept 
benefits the conservation side more than the development side of the equation. There is no clear win-win 
situation realized in the CBC approach. For example, when the total area under conservation through the 
creation of WMAs is considered, the last 10 years of WMA regulations implementation added 28,389Km2 
of land under protection [40]. Considering Tanzania’s total land area of 945,000Km2, this area represents 
3% of the total land area. However, until 1998, the total wildlife protected area network of Tanzania was 
28% of the total land area, comprising 12 national parks (4%),  the Ngorongoro conservation area (1%), 
31 game reserves (15%) and 38 game controlled areas ( 8%) [38] (See Note 8). It follows that the WMAs 
created in village lands have significantly added to the total protected area network, a net gain to 
conservation in Tanzania. Moreover, the 17 established WMAs act as important buffer zones to the core 
protected areas, thus fulfilling the WPT objective to “promote the conservation of wildlife and its habitats 
outside core areas (NPs, GRs and GCAs) by creating WMAs; and “to transfer the management of WMAs 
to local communities thus taking care of corridors, migration routes and buffer zones…” [38] (emphasis 
added). According to USAID [26], the increased area under conservation provides long-term increased 
income to core protected area authorities, such as the Tanzania National Parks Authority (TANAPA), and 
the Wildlife Division from increased sustainability and productivity of wildlife resources through tourism 
and tourist hunting.  
On the local development side, the WMAs have had no such impact, as the Ecosystem and Renewable 
Resources Consulting Group (ERRCG) [40] notes: “at present the AAs have not addressed the poverty 
issues at household level…even in AAs with relatively good annual income from WMAs…”[40]. For 
instance, in Burunge WMA, annual income from WMA related activities has been used mainly to support 
community-level social projects such as building of classrooms, laboratories and village government 
offices. In Idodi-Pawaga WMA, such income has mainly been used as sitting and travel allowances for 
WMA leaders to attend meetings and follow up on court cases.  Failure to address poverty at the 
household level, particularly the provision of alternative income-generating activities that are 
fundamental to the livelihoods of the local people [30, 40] may erode the interest and willingness of the 
communities to conserve wildlife, making enemies of  wildlife enemies once again [8, 10]. Furthermore, 
Mwakaje et.al. [48], in their analysis of income governance from the Serengeti ecosystem observe that 
households received an average $20.85 annual income from conservation related activities in Loliondo 
District (see Note 9). DeGeorges and Reilly [34], in their discussion of the shortcomings of the economics 
of CBNRM, note that while it is possible for some community conservation areas to generate substantial 
revenues from conservation, the amount at household level is insignificant. This is mainly due to the fact 
that first, human to resources ratio is high (as in villages surrounding Serengeti ecosystem [48]), and 
second, the majority of the revenue is captured by the central government through trophy hunting.  
Although the government has strived to be transparent on revenue sharing from hunting concessions (see 
Note 10), WWF [28] notes that the transfer of funds from the government (which collects the revenues 
from investors in WMAs) is often delayed and lacking transparency on what is actually collected and 
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remitted through the benefit-sharing mechanism. Consequently, WMA operational costs such as office 
running costs and conducting patrols are seriously affected by this centralization of revenue collection by 
the government.  
The broad implication of these shortcomings is that the CBC approach is not the magic formula to solve 
the problems arising from the failure of fortress conservation. Its implementation is plagued with a series 
of drawbacks which have been extensively debated throughout the community conservation discourse. It 
is difficult to accept the win-win situation envisaged by its proponents. We discuss in the following section 
some of the challenges facing CBC in Tanzania. 
 
3. Discussion 
3.1. CBC approach: Fortress conservation in disguise? 
Skeptics of CBC hold that this shift in conservation paradigm (from fortress conservation to CBC) is a mere 
continuation of the centralized state control of wildlife resources [10, 23, 33, 35, 55]. It represents a 
disguised form of wildlife control by the state, in a more placatory way to reduce opposition and conflicts 
with rural communities caused by active command and control approaches [8, 10, 30, 53-55]. For 
example, the WPT explicitly state that:  
[“In recognition of the importance of conservation of biological diversity to the livelihood of 
mankind, the state will retain the overall ownership of wildlife… The government will access user 
rights to various stakeholders to access wildlife and wetland resources, in order to ensure that 
national priorities are addressed and abuses controlled” [39] [emphasis added] 
This policy statement confirms that the CBC approach is an extension of the fortress conservation 
approach [10, 29, 30, 55], belying the good intentions of enabling the rural communities and the private 
sector to participate and benefit from the use of wildlife through creation of WMAs [38, 39]. On the other 
hand, the policy and regulatory changes necessary for the new conservation approach are often shaped 
by the elite state and non-state conservationists with little or no participation by the communities. The 
resulting governance structures often circumscribe the participatory rights and interests of the local 
people that the policy and regulatory changes claim to address in the first place.  The power and interest 
of the elites in government and non-governmental organizations to maintain their control over wildlife 
are thereby safeguarded [24].  
For instance, the lucrative tourist hunting business in Tanzania is controlled by the state through the 
Director of Wildlife [24, 25]. In hunting blocks falling within WMAs the revenue is first centrally collected 
and later appropriated to the respective WMA in accordance with the benefit sharing mechanism [51]. It 
has been argued that the new policies and laws of community conservation in Tanzania have actually led 
to recentralization of power and authority to the state [39, 51, 56] and that the CBC approach to WMAs 
amounts to coercion [23].  At the WMA level, conflicts of interest and corruption allegations are common 
within the WMA leadership structure. For instance, in Idodi-Pawaga WMA, the elite’s interests in lucrative 
hunting blocks have caused internal conflicts within the WMA Advisory Board, prompting the WMA 
participating villages, through the District Commissioner, to dissolve it.  More recently, members of the 
WMA Executive Committee have been dismissed for mishandling investment contracts and for alleged 
corruption.  Conflicts of interest between WMA leaders and investors have led to court cases with 
significant financial losses to the WMA [See Note 11]. 
Meanwhile, Igoe and Croucher [25] suggest that Tanzania’s transition to neo-liberal governance models 
has contextualized the way in which WMAs have been created and operated through reregulation. 
Reregulation is the use of the state to commodify previously non-tradable resources that were previously 
not owned, state owned, or community owned [25]. In the WMA plan, this is achieved by granting 
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collective legal titles to the participating villages, which thereby become partners in business ventures 
[25]. This explains the need for village land titles, land use plans, and clearly marked boundaries, among 
other requirements in the application for a WMA. Neumann [57] indicates that the partitioning of space 
(as in land use plans) subtly achieves population control near protected areas, reducing the use of force 
and coercion.  This is a clear commodification of wildlife resources outside core protected areas by the 
state through reregulation, forcing local people to exclude themselves from their own land [25, 57]. The 
outcome of recentralization and reregulation has been resistance by the communities to accept the WMA 
approach in some areas [23, 25, 58, see Note 12].  
 
3.2. Devolution of Power and authority  
The wildlife sector in Tanzania (and elsewhere in Africa) is a lucrative industry with great commercial value 
[24]. For instance, the tourism sector, which is largely wildlife-based, contributed about 17.5% of the 
national GDP in 2012 [48]. For this reason, various reforms in the wildlife sector since the colonial era have 
centralized power and authority in shaping the decisions and rules about wildlife. Although the definition 
of power is often contested, it can generally be used to mean the ability of one party to gain the 
compliance of the other; in other words, the ability of A to make B do what B would otherwise not do [59, 
60]. In CBC, power refers to ability to make decisions about how resources are used, to create rules or 
modify old ones, and to ensure compliance with them [61]. The passive and active devolution of power 
and authority in the wildlife sector in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa demonstrated the state’s interest 
in maintaining control over wildlife, limiting communities’ ability to benefit from the wildlife industry. In 
the WMA implementation process, manifestations of power are apparent in the state’s maintenance of 
overall ownership of wildlife [38, 39] and lack of transparency in benefit sharing, particularly income from 
both consumptive and non-consumptive use [28, 40]. This has led to patronage and rent-seeking behavior 
by state officials, perpetuating the centralized control over wildlife [23, 24]. The new Wildlife Conservation 
Act (2009) virtually reverted to and even expanded the hegemonic control of regulatory and management 
framework by the state [62]. Notwithstanding the decentralized environmental governance rhetoric over 
the last three decades, there is little evidence to suggest that the central government has actually 
devolved power and authority to the communities.  
 In addition, Murphree [63] attributes the failure of the CBC approach to the inability to democratically 
decentralize and devolve power and resources to those in need. He notes that those with the power to 
devolve power and control of resources to local communities have a strong interest in resisting these 
changes, while those with objective interest in such changes have neither the power nor the resources to 
effect them [64]. Thus, power and desired changes pull in opposite directions, resulting in 
underperformance of many CBC projects, as is the case with WMAs in Tanzania. We therefore suggest 
that the opposing ends between power and desired changes be carefully negotiated to obtain a level 
playing field. As Adams and Hulme [8] argue, these conflicting interests could be re-negotiated and 
reconciled, but only if the state agency is flexible and willing to deviate from its pre-determined 
conservation goals.  
 
3.3. Can communities be trusted? 
Another observation of CBC underperformance relates to trust. We contend that communities are 
knowledgeable actors in conservation, with longer histories and interactions with wildlife than the state. 
However, in practice, communities are often ignored and their rich indigenous knowledge not 
acknowledged in the promulgation of various programs.  Although communities are presumed capable of 
designing their own rules and regulations for sustainable management and use of common property [34, 
65, 72], the state assumes that communities cannot safeguard the sustainable management and use of 
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resources. For example, the Wildlife Conservation Act (2009) states explicitly that “the Minister 
(responsible for wildlife) shall, in consultation with the Minister responsible for local government 
authorities prepare model by-laws to be adopted with such necessary changes by the village authorities 
which shall apply in the respective Wildlife Management Area” [56][emphasis added].  According to the 
Act, the Minister, in making such regulations, is supposed to ensure that the communities are properly 
consulted and informed on how such communities shall benefit from WMAs. Yet participation by 
consultation, according to IIED [31] implies that the state agency defines both the problem and the 
solution, with no guarantee that local people’s views will be considered. To this end, we make two 
observations; first is the state’s lack of trust in existing local institutions to govern resources, and second, 
the passive participation by communities in crafting institutions that would eventually affect their 
resources use and management. The former represent a potential conflict between the state’s pre-
determined conservation goals and community well-being, since in many cases, as Berkes [66] argues, 
most local institutions are about allocation, use and conflict management rather than conservation per 
se.  
Undoubtedly, control of natural resources by the state agency has led to coercive policies, laws, and 
regulations to control access and use of natural resources, including wildlife, with little regard for the 
needs and interests of the locals. While the premises for successful CBC projects and Common Pool 
Resources (CPR) [8, 13, 15, 63, 65, 67, 68] are presumably well known to the actors in the decentralization 
process, they have been largely ignored to protect and sustain the interest of one party (the state) at the 
expense of the locals [23, 24, 62, 72]. As a result, this conservation model has largely failed to ensure 
sustainable conservation of wildlife resources or to make institutional changes that acknowledge the 
importance of the communities [10]. 
Communities at the local levels could be given opportunities to design and craft their own institutions for 
managing wildlife and other resources. This, of course, has to take into account the diversity of CPRs [69] 
and issues of scale and location. Albeit crafting local institutions for managing mobile, 
renewable/biological resources (such as wildlife) appears to be a complex task [68], but community 
decision-making is an important design  principle for the sustainability of such common pool resources 
[65, 68]. 
3.4. Linking conservation and development: importance of trade-offs 
It has been argued that linking conservation and development will not serve any objective and therefore 
they should be de-linked [11, 70]. Various misunderstandings of the trade-offs between conservation and 
development have emerged over the last three decades.  For example, McShane et al. [30] argue that 
ineffective communication about the real trade-offs between conservation and development has fueled 
criticism of CBC. Failure to recognize and acknowledge the trade-offs between conservation and 
development implies that the win-win rhetoric of integrated development and conservation projects has 
failed massively to deliver either of the intended objectives. This has led to a reversion to the fortress 
conservation approach, based on the moral imperative to protect biodiversity in strictly ‘people free 
parks’ [71]. This is because human-induced biodiversity loss continues at an alarming rate: human beings, 
as natural creatures, tend to improve their wellbeing to the detriment of nature [30, 71], as in the 
resurgence of elephant poaching in Tanzania, and thus, “dire circumstances require extreme measures” 
[71]. However, this paradigm shift has been criticized for its lack of attention to the political and social 




Mongabay.com Open Access Journal - Tropical Conservation Science Vol.8 (4): 1080-1097, 2015 
 
  
Tropical Conservation Science | ISSN 1940-0829 | Tropicalconservationscience.org 
1093 
4. Conclusions and implications for conservation 
The wildlife sector in Tanzania has undergone significant policy and legal changes in management and use 
before, during, and after the colonial period. Despite these changes, the command and control 
conservation model continues to manifest not only in the protection of core protected areas, but also in 
the supposed community conservation areas (WMAs). Local communities, supposedly the custodians and 
immediate beneficiaries of wildlife, continue to be peripheral spectators.  
Decentralized environmental governance, particularly democratic decentralization, promises: (i) to 
transfer power and authority to local levels, (ii) to bring decision-making closer to the people, thus 
increasing participation and accountability, and (iii) to allow decision makers to make decisions based on 
local knowledge of the natural resources [3]. Our analysis indicates that none of these promises have been 
or can be fully attained, given the current practice on the ground that recentralizes power and resources 
by the state. Efficiency, equity, and inclusion in WMAs remain elusive, which seriously erodes their 
sustainability over time. The arduous process of establishing a WMA, conflicts over land use and benefit 
sharing mechanisms, and the inability to understand, communicate and appreciate the trade-offs 
between conservation and development  are shortcomings not only  in the implementation per se but 
also in the very theoretical premises of the CBC approach. The near-absence of community participation, 
the lack of trust in communities to manage their own resources, and the high costs incurred by 
communities adjacent to protected areas point to the ineffectiveness of the decentralized CBC as an 
alternative to the fortress conservation approach. Although decentralized environmental governance as 
a political process has not entirely failed, it has largely failed to achieve its intended results. Efforts to 
redress its failures must start from the drawing board, carefully renegotiating positions, interests, power 
and authority regarding wildlife management.  
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Notes  
Note 1 Also known as Community Wildlife Management (CWM), Community Based Natural Resources 
Management (CBNRM), and Participatory Forest Management (PFM) 
 
Note 2 Although defining a community poses some significant challenges regarding space, scale, use, and 
interest, “community’ in the CBC context can be functionally defined as the “profiles of interactions 
required for people to organise themselves for effective common pool resource management at levels 
below and  beyond the effective reach of state bureaucratic management,”  see [45]. 
 
Note 3 According to Nelson et al [6] the first hunting regulations were issued in 1891 to control the 
declining wildlife populations, particularly elephants, whose numbers had dwindled following years of 
exploitation by the commercial ivory trade. 
 
Note 4 Core Protected Areas according to the Wildlife Conservation Act include National Parks, Game 
Reserves, Wetland Reserve, the Ngorongoro Conservation Area, and any other protected area declared 
under the WCA (2009) or any other written law. 
 
Note 5 Such additional requirements include a boundary description of the proposed WMA, its size, name, 
and a sketch map, and a Resource Management Zone Plan which serves as an interim plan pending the 
preparation of a General Management Plan. 
 
Note 6 These grants have funded an array of activities related to WMA implementation, ranging from 
supporting infrastructure (USAID cash for work program) to capacity building, project outreach and 
project development.  
 
Note 7 According to the Wildlife Conservation (Wildlife Management Areas) regulations 2012, an 
Authorised Association is a community-based organisation whose primary objective is to conserve wildlife 
resources for the benefit of the community members ordinarily residing in that particular area. An AA 
status is a stage where an AA has applied and successfully secured user rights to manage and utilise 
wildlife resources in accordance with the WMA regulations. 
 
Note 8 The number of National Parks has increased to 16, while some of the Game Controlled Areas have 
been de-gazetted into village lands to allow for creation of WMAs 
 
Note 9 Calculations based on $213,000 accrued from conservation in 2009, assuming 50% of the income 
goes to 5105 households in Loliondo district. 
 
Note 10 The revised WMA regulations (2012) give mandate to Authorized Associations (AAs) to negotiate 
and appoint a tourist hunting company in a WMA with a hunting block, but only after the Director’s advice. 
Note 11 Information Based on field interviews with key informants in Idodi-Pawaga WMA 
Note 12 Examples include Twatwatwa WMA, (Kilosa, started 2003) Loliondo WMA (Ngorongoro, started 
2003). Some villages within WMAs are threatening to withdraw such as Minjingu village in Burunge WMA, 
Babati. 
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